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ABSTRACT
The paper develops a model of foreign direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments
(FPI).The model describes an information-based trade off between direct investments and portfolio
investments. Direct investors are more informed about the fundamentals of their projects. This
information enables them to manage their projects more efficiently. However, it also creates an
asymmetric-information problem in case they need to sell their projects prematurely, and reduces the
price they can get in that case. As a result, investors, who know they are more likely to get a liquidity
shock that forces them to sell early, are more likely to choose portfolio investments, whereas
investors, who know they are less likely to get a liquidity shock, are more likely to choose direct
investments.  FDI is characterized by hands-on management style which enables the owner to obtain
relatively refined information about the productivity of the firm. This superiority of FDI relative to
FPI, comes with a cost: a firm owned by the relatively well-informed FDI investor has a low resale
price because of a "lemons" type asymmetric information between the owner and potential buyers.
The model can explain several stylized facts regarding foreign equity flows, such as the larger ratio
of FDI to FPI inflows in developing countries relative to developed countries, and the greater
volatility of FDI net inflows relative to FPI net inflows.
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International equity ﬂows are the main feature of the recent globalization of capital markets both
in developing and in developed economies. These ﬂows take two major forms: Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI). An empirical regularity is that the
share of FDI in total foreign equity ﬂows is larger for developing countries than for developed
countries.1 Regarding the second moments of foreign equity ﬂows, it is known that the volatility
of FDI net inﬂows is, in general, much smaller than that of FPI net inﬂows.2 Moreover, empirical
analysis has established that the diﬀerences in volatility between FPI and FDI ﬂows are much
smaller for developed economies than for developing economies.3
Despite the empirical interest in foreign equity ﬂows, very little work has been done on jointly
explaining FDI and FPI in a rigorous theoretical framework. In this paper, we propose such a
framework, and provide a model of a trade oﬀ between FDI and FPI, which is consistent with the
empirical facts mentioned above.
Our model highlights a key diﬀerence between the two types of investment: FDI investors, who
take both ownership and control positions in the domestic ﬁrms, are in eﬀect the managers of the
ﬁrms under their control; whereas FPI investors, who gain ownership without control of domestic
ﬁrms, must delegate decisions to managers, but limit their freedom to make decisions because the
managers’ agenda may not be always consistent with that of the owners. Consequently, due to
an agency problem between managers and owners, portfolio investment projects are managed less
eﬃciently than direct investment projects.4 To be more speciﬁc, direct investors, who act eﬀectively
1For a summary, based on World Bank data, see Albuquerque (2003).
2Net inﬂows account for net investments made by foreign investors (that is, new investments by foreign investors
minus withdrawals of old investments by foreign investors).
Using World Bank data on 111 countries, Albuquerque (2003) shows that 89% of the countries in his sample have
lower coeﬃcient of variation of net FDI inﬂows than that of other net inﬂows. A related set of evidence suggests
that FDI has proven to be much more resilient during ﬁnancial crises, and thus contributes to the stability of the
host country. (See: Chuhan, Perez-Quiros and Popper, 1996; Frankel and Rose, 1996; Lipsey, 2001; and Sarno and
Taylor, 1999).
3Lipsey (1999) shows that the ratio of FDI’s volatility to other long-term ﬂows’ volatility is 0.59 in Latin America,
0.74 in South East Asia, 0.86 in Europe, and 0.88 in the US. Thus, the diﬀerences in volatilities between net FDI
inﬂows and other types of net inﬂows are smaller in developed economies.
4For a recent survey on agency problems and their eﬀect on ﬁnancial contracting, see: Hart (2001).
2as managers of their own projects, are more informed than portfolio investors regarding changes
in the prospects of their projects. This information enables them to manage their projects more
eﬃciently. This eﬀect generates an advantage, with an added value in the capital markets, to direct
investments relative to portfolio investments.
There are, however, costs to direct investments. We specify two types of costs. The ﬁrst type
reﬂects the initial cost that an FDI investor has to incur in order to acquire the expertise to manage
the project directly. This cost is exogenously given in the model. The second type, an information-
based cost, is derived endogenously in the model. It results from the possibility that investors need
to sell their investments before maturity because they face liquidity shocks. In such circumstances,
the price they can get will be lower if they have more information on the economic fundamentals
of the investment project. This is because when potential buyers know that the seller has more
information, they may suspect that the sale results from bad information on the prospects of the
investment, and will thus be willing to pay a lower price. Thus, if they invest directly, the investors
bear the cost of getting a lower price if and when they are forced to sell the project before maturity.
Our model, therefore, describes a key trade oﬀ between management eﬃciency and liquidity.5
Both sides of this trade oﬀ are driven by the eﬀect of asymmetric information, which comes with
control. When they invest directly, investors get more information about the fundamentals of the
investment, and thereby can manage the project more eﬃciently, than their portfolio-investors
counterparts. However, this also generates a ”lemons” type problem when they try to sell the
investment before maturity (Akerlof (1970)). Therefore, this superior information eﬀect reduces
the price they can get when they are forced to sell the project prematurely.
This trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and liquidity has strong roots in existing empirical evidence.
The idea that control increases eﬃciency and value of the ﬁrm, which constitutes one side of the
trade oﬀ, is supported empirically by two recent papers in the international ﬁnance literature. The
ﬁrst paper — by Perez-Gonzalez (2005) — shows that after a foreign investor establishes a position
that is greater than 50% of the ﬁrm’s shares, the ﬁrm’s productivity, computed using data on future
earnings, improves. The second paper — by Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2005) — demonstrates the
5Note that the interpretation of the word ”liquidity” here is diﬀerent from the one in the phrase ”liquidity shock”.
Here, ”liquidity” means that when they invest in FDI, investors will face a less liquid market when they want to sell,
in the sense that they will get a lower price. A ”liquidity shock” means that an investor is facing a shock that forces
her to liquidate the investment.
3positive response in the stock market to the establishment of control (deﬁned, again, as more than
50% ownership). Since having more than 50% ownership is the ultimate indication for control,
these two papers provide clear evidence on the link between control and value, which is a basic
premise of our paper. It should be noted, however, that large shareholders can achieve eﬀective
control in many cases by holding a block that is much smaller than 50% of the ﬁrm. This has been
n o t e di nt h eﬁnance literature by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and
others. Going back to our basic premise, this implies that the value of the ﬁrm may increase with
ownership concentration even when the controlling shareholder has a block that is smaller than
50%. Such evidence is provided by Wruck (1989) and by Hertzel and Smith (1993). This is much
in line with our focus on the trade oﬀ between FDI and FPI, since many FDI investments exhibit
blocks that are much smaller than 50%.
The other side of the trade oﬀ — the idea that the sale of shares by control holders generates
a larger price impact than a sale by other investors — can be supported by two strands in the
ﬁnance literature. First, it has been shown that the sale of stocks by large blockholders has a
bigger downward eﬀect on the price than sales of stocks by other investors. For example, see:
Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1990), and Chan and Lakonishok
(1995). Following the logic above, this result may well apply to the basic premise of our paper, as
large blockholders probably have more control over the ﬁrms’ management. Second, perhaps the
best evidence on the price impact of sale in the presence of control can be obtained by looking at
what happens when the ﬁrm sells its own shares. After all, the ﬁrm has ultimate control over its
operations, and thus this type of transaction is expected to suﬀer most from asymmetric information
between the seller (ﬁrm) and potential buyers. Indeed, the ﬁnance literature has documented the
large decrease in price following an announcement by the ﬁrm that it is going to sell new equity
(a seasoned equity oﬀering, SEO). For example, see: Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Korajczyk,
Lucas, and MacDonald (1991).6
6This obviously also applies to the well-known underpricing phenomena in ﬁrms’ initial public oﬀerings (IPOs),
although here we do not observe the price before the oﬀering, and thus cannot compare it with the oﬀering price.
Still, an interesting piece of evidence from IPOs that supports the premise in our model is that when entrepreneurs
keep more shares of the ﬁrm after the IPO, the price they get for the IPO is higher (see Downes and Heinkel (1982)).
Since entrepreneurs undoubtedly control their ﬁrms, they are expected to have private information on them, and thus
the fact that they choose to sell fewer shares sends a positive signal that increases the price.
4A main implication of the trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and liquidity described in our paper is
that investors with high (low) expected liquidity needs are more likely to choose less (more) control.
This is because investors with high expected liquidity needs are aﬀected more by the low sale price
associated with control, whereas those with low expected liquidity needs are aﬀected more by the
eﬃciency in management. As a result, in equilibrium, assets under control are less likely to be
liquidated prematurely. This is consistent with evidence provided by Hennart, Kim, and Zeng
(1998) and other papers in the management literature. They show that international investors
are much more likely to exit from joint ventures than from fully owned investments, which clearly
exhibit more control. In the context of our paper, since FDI exhibit more control than FPI, FDI
are expected to be liquidated less often. This is consistent with empirical evidence cited in the
beginning of our paper. It also contributes to the low volatility of net FDI inﬂows relative to net
FPI inﬂows, which is one of the key observations motivating our analysis.
Interestingly, these eﬀects are magniﬁed by asymmetric-information externalities among in-
vestors with high expected liquidity needs: when fewer investors of their type choose direct invest-
ments, the re-sale price of these investments will decrease, and the incentive of each investor of this
type to choose these investments will decrease. These externalities generate multiple equilibria for
some parameter values in our model, where some equilibria are characterized by more FDI than
others. We show in the paper that when such multiplicity exists, the host country beneﬁts more
under the equilibrium that exhibits more FDI.
Of course, equilibrium patterns of investment will vary across countries, depending on the char-
acteristics of investors and on those of the host country itself. In the paper we analyze the patterns
of investment as a function of three parameters: the heterogeneity across foreign investors in their
expected liquidity needs, the cost of production in the host country, and the level of transparency
between owners and managers in the host country (corporate-governance transparency). We em-
ploy our results on the last two parameters to derive predictions regarding the diﬀerences between
developed economies and developing economies. These predictions, which are broadly consistent
with the empirical facts described above, are based on the hypotheses that developed countries
have higher costs of production and higher levels of transparency than developing countries.
Some papers in the literature develop ideas related to the ideas in the current paper. Albu-
querque (2003) develops a model aimed at explaining the diﬀerences between the volatility of direct
5investments and the volatility of portfolio investments. His paper relies on expropriation risks and
the inalienability of direct investments, and thus is diﬀerent from the information-based mechanism
developed here.
Other papers in the literature use the asymmetric information hypothesis to address diﬀerent
issues related to FDI. In Froot and Stein (1991), Klein and Rosengren (1994), and Klein, Peek
and Rosengren (2002), the hypothesis is that FDI is information intensive, and thus FDI investors,
who know more about their investments than outsiders, face a problem in raising resources for
their investments. Gordon and Lans Bovenberg (1996) assume asymmetric information between
domestic investors and foreign investors to explain the home bias phenomenon. Razin, Sadka and
Yuen (1998) explain the pecking order of international capital ﬂows with a model of asymmetric
information. Finally, Razin and Sadka (2003) analyze the gains from FDI when foreign direct
investors have superior information on the fundamentals of their investment, relative to foreign
portfolio investors. Importantly, none of these papers analyzes the eﬀects of asymmetric information
on the liquidity of FDI and FPI, which is a major factor in the trade oﬀ d e v e l o p e di nt h ec u r r e n t
paper.
Finally, although we write this paper in the context of international capital ﬂows, we believe
the mechanism we suggest here is more general, and can serve to analyze the trade oﬀ between
direct investments and portfolio investments, or between management eﬃciency and liquidity, in
other contexts.7 In a related paper, Bolton and von-Thadden (1998) analyze a trade oﬀ between
direct investments and portfolio investments. Their model, however, is not based on the diﬀerences
in information that each one of these investments provides. Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug
(1998) study models where the information held by institutional investors does not always improve
the value of the ﬁrm, as institutional investors might use this information to make trading proﬁts
instead of to improve ﬁrm performance. These models do not look, however, at the decision of the
investors on whether to acquire information when they might get liquidity shocks. Our paper also
touches on other issues that have been discussed in the ﬁnance literature. Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1991) discuss the incentive of traders to reveal the fact that they are trading for liquidity reasons
and not because of bad information. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan
7The model is especially relevant in the context of international ﬂo w sb e c a u s et h e r ei sas t r o n ge m p i r i c a le v i d e n c e
on the composition and volatility of international ﬂows, which can be explained by our trade oﬀ.
6(1990) point to the existence of externalities between traders who trade for liquidity reasons.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3,
we study the basic trade oﬀ between direct investments and portfolio investments. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the patterns of investments obtained in equilibrium for diﬀerent parameter values. In Section
5, we extend the model to allow for diﬀerent levels of transparency, and study the eﬀect of trans-
parency on the equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 concludes, and highlights additional implications
of our model. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
A small economy is faced by a continuum [0,1] of foreign investors. Each investor has an opportunity
to invest in one investment project. Investment can occur in two forms. The ﬁrst form is a direct
investment. The second form is a portfolio investment. The diﬀerence between the two forms of
investment, in our model, is that a direct investor will eﬀectively act like a manager, whereas in case
of a portfolio investment, the investor will not be the manager, and the project will be managed by
an ”outsider”. We assume that investors are risk neutral, and thus each investor chooses the form
of investment that maximizes her ex-ante expected payoﬀ.
There are three periods of time: 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, each investor decides whether to make
a direct investment or a portfolio investment. In period 2, the project matures. The payoﬀ from
the project is denoted as R,w h e r eR is given by:




Here, ε denotes a random productivity factor (technology shock) that is independently realized
for each project in period 1; k is the level of capital input invested in the project in period 1, after
the realization of ε. We assume that ε is distributed between −1 and 1, a c c o r d i n gt oac u m u l a t i v e
distribution function G(·), and a density function g(·)=G0 (·). We also assume that E(ε)=0 .8
8Our results hold for more general speciﬁcations of the distribution of ε. We use this speciﬁcation merely to
simplify the exposition.
72.1 Management and Eﬃciency
In period 1, after the realization of the technology shock, the manager of the project observes ε.
Thus, if the investor owns the project as a direct investment, she observes ε,a n dc h o o s e sk,s oa s



























In case of a portfolio investment, the owner is not the manager, and thus she does not observe
ε. In this case, the manager follows earlier instructions as for the level of k. A possible rationale
behind this sequence of ﬁrm decisions, whereby the level of capital input k is determined ex ante,
has to do with a potential agency problem between the owner and the manager (who is responsible
for making these decisions). Loosely speaking, the latter is not exclusively interested in the net
worth of the ﬁrm as is the former. For example, with no explicit instructions at hand, the manager
m a yw i s ht os e tk at the highest possible level in order to gain power and ﬁnancial rewards. As a
result, when the owner does not have information about the ﬁrm’s productivity, she will have to
set investment guidelines for the manager (who knows more about ε than she does) so as to protect
her own interests.9
The ex-ante instruction is chosen by the owner so as to maximize the expected return absent
any information on the realization of ε, and is based on the ex ante mean of ε: 0.T h u s , t h e
9The argument, according to which the manager wishes to make larger investments and build an empire is common
in the corporate ﬁnance literature (see: Jensen (1986)). In such a case, if the owner cannot verify the information
that the manager had at the time of the decision, she will not be able to prove that the manager acted to maximize
his own objective function. As a result, a contract that instructs the manager to maximize the value of the ﬁrm given
his information will not be enforceable.
The agency problem is not modelled explicitly here because we want to focus instead on its implications for the
trade oﬀ between direct investments and portfolio investments. What we do, however, capture in our model is the
spirit of the agency problem, and the ineﬃciency associated with the fact that the owner of the project is not the
manager.
8manager will be instructed to choose k = k∗ (0) = 1
A.10 Then, the ex-ante expected payoﬀ from a
















Comparing (3) with (4), we see that if the project is held until maturity, it yields a higher payoﬀ
as a direct investment than as a portfolio investment. This result reﬂects the eﬃciency that results
from a hands-on management style in the case of a direct investment.
There are, however, costs to direct investments. We specify two types of costs. The ﬁrst type,
reﬂects the initial cost that an FDI investor has to incur in order to acquire the expertise to manage
the project directly. We denote this cost, which is exogenously given in the model, by c.W es i m p l y
assume that an investor who chooses FDI over FPI has to pay the ﬁx e dc o s ta tt i m e0.
The second type, an information-based cost, is derived endogenously in the model. It results
from the possibility of liquidity shocks occurring in period 1.
2.2 Liquidity Shocks and Resale Prices
In period 1, before the value of ε is observed, the owner of the project might get a liquidity shock.
With the realization of a liquidity shock, the investor is forced to sell the project immediately,
i.e., in period 1. This feature of the model is similar to the preference-shock assumption made by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983): an investor who is subject to a liquidity shock derives her utility
only from period-1 consumption. If, however, she is not subject to a liquidity shock, she derives
her utility from period-2 consumption. As a result, an investor who is subject to a liquidity shock
is forced to sell the project in period 1, because she cannot aﬀord to wait and collect the payoﬀ
from the project in period 2.
We denote by λ the probability of liquidity shocks. We assume that there are two types of
foreign investors. Proportion 1
2 of the investors have high expected liquidity needs, and proportion
1
2 have low expected liquidity needs. Formally, we assume that the ﬁrst type of investors face a
10The current speciﬁcation, according to which the owner of a portfolio investment receives no information on the
realization of ε, and thus instructs the manager to choose k a c c o r d i n gt ot h eex-ante mean of ε is simple and is
intended to capture the spirit of the ineﬃciency. The result will hold under more general speciﬁcations. For example,
in Section 5 we study an extension, in which the owner observes ε, but only with some probability.
9liquidity need with probability λH, whereas the second type face a liquidity need with probability
λL.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w ea s s u m et h a t1 >λ H > 1
2 >λ L > 0,a n dt h a tλH +λL =1 .11 Investors know
their type ex ante, but this is their own private information.
There is, however, also a possibility that an investor will liquidate a project in period 1 even if
there is no liquidity shock. This can happen if and only if the initial investor observes a relatively
low realization of ε. In such a case she does have superior information over the buyer, and can
exploit it. Because portfolio investors do not observe ε in period 1, only direct investors sell their
investment project at that time when a liquidity shock is absent.12 Because all kinds of sales occur
simultaneously in period 1, buyers do not know the reason for a sale of any individual project.
They know, however, whether the investment project is sold by a direct investor or by a portfolio
investor. Because only direct investment projects are sold due to low productivity shocks, the price
that direct investors can get when they try to sell the project in period 1 will be lower than the
price obtained by portfolio investors. This generates a cost of the second type to FDI.
To evaluate this cost, we now derive the price that a direct investor gets if she sells the project
in period 1. The price is equal to the expected value of the project from the point of view of the
buyer, given that the buyer knows that the owner is trying to sell, and given that she does not
know the reason for the sale. We denote the threshold level of ε, under which the direct investor
is selling the project in absence of a liquidity shock by εD. Also, we denote by λD the probability,
as perceived by the market, that an FDI investor gets a liquidity shock. Both εD and λD will be
endogenously determined in equilibrium. Given that the FDI owner sells her project, the buyer
thinks that with probability (1 − λD)G(εD) the owner is selling the project due to a low realization
of ε, and with probability λD she sells the project because of a liquidity shock.
If the project is sold due to a liquidity shock, that is, before the initial owner observes ε (recall
that liquidity shocks are realized before productivity shocks), the value of ε is not recorded in the
ﬁrm before the sale. Therefore, the buyer does not know the value of ε. However, if the project is
sold for low-proﬁtability reasons, the new owner will know the value of ε after the sale.13
11Note that our results hold in a more general setting, that is, for any λH >λ L.
12This is again a result of our speciﬁcation, in which the owner of a portfolio investment receives no information
on the realization of ε in period 1. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.
13Note that this is just a technical assumption regarding the procedures of the sale. It does not qualitatively aﬀect
the results.













The initial owner, in turn, sets the threshold level εD, such that given P1,D, when observing εD,






Thus, equations (5) and (6) simultaneously determine P1,D and εD as a function of the market-
perceived probability λD. Proposition 1 characterizes εD(λD) and P1,D(λD).
Proposition 1 (i) For every 0 ≤ λD ≤ 1, there is a unique solution to εD between −1 and 0,
where εD(λD) is monotonically increasing in λD.
(ii) For every 0 ≤ λD ≤ 1, there is a unique solution to P1,D between 0 and 1
2A,w h e r eP1,D(λD)
is monotonically increasing in λD.
The intuition that εD(λD) and P1,D(λD) are increasing in λD is as follows: when λD is high,
the buyer thinks that the probability that an early sale results from a liquidity shock (and not from
a bad realization of the productivity parameter) is also high. Consequently, the resale price of the
project in period 1 is high as well. This means that FDI investors sell their projects more often
(that is, under a higher threshold εD). An implication is that investors have a greater incentive
to choose FDI in period 0 when the market participants think that investors with high liquidity
needs choose FDI. This externality plays an important role in the next section where we derive the
equilibrium allocation and market prices.
Another noteworthy part of the proposition is that εD is always below 0, and consequently P1,D
is always below 1
2A. This feature plays an important role in the comparison between the resale price
of FDI and the resale price of portfolio investments. To conduct this comparison, let us characterize
the resale price of a portfolio investment project. Essentially, when a portfolio investor sells the
project in period 1, everybody knows she does it because of a liquidity shock. Thus, the price she










11Now, we can see that the resale price of a direct investment in period 1 is always lower than
the resale price of a portfolio investment in that period. The intuition is that if a direct investor
prematurely sells the investment project, the market price must reﬂect the possibility that the sale
originates from inside information on low prospects of this investment project.
We can now summarize the essential trade-oﬀ between FDI and FPI. A beneﬁto fad i r e c t
investment is that it enables the investor to manage the project more eﬃciently. This increases
the return that she gets in case she does not have to sell the project prematurely. However, if a
foreign investor ex-ante chooses to hold the project as a direct investment, but sells the project
prematurely, she gets a relatively low price. This is because potential buyers perceive that with
some probability the project is sold due to negative inside information about the prospects of the
investment. Thus, the additional information associated with a direct investment is not necessarily
beneﬁcial. In addition, investing directly entails a ﬁxed cost c.W i t hs u c ht r a d eo ﬀ between FDI
and FPI in mind, investors choose the type of investment that maximizes their ex ante expected
payoﬀ. We now turn to study this choice.
3 Ex-Ante Choice between FDI and FPI
3.1 Expected Value of FDI
With probability λi, investor i gets a liquidity shock, and sells the project in period 1. (Note that







With probability 1 − λi, the investor does not get a liquidity shock. She sells the project if the
realization of ε is below εD(λD), but she does not sell it if the realization of ε is above εD(λD).
Recall that (εD(λD) is determined by equations (5) and (6)). Therefore, the expected payoﬀ,i n













12In addition, a direct investor has to incur a ﬁxed cost of c. Thus, the ex-ante expected payoﬀ
for a direct investor, as a function of λi, λD and A,i sg i v e nb y :




















3.2 Expected Value of FPI
When the investor holds the investment as a portfolio investment, with probability λi, she receives





With probability 1 − λi, the investor does not receive a liquidity shock. Then, her expected
payoﬀ is:











3.3 FDI vs. FPI
We deﬁne the diﬀerence between the expected value of FDI and the expected value of FPI as
follows:
Diff (λi,λ D,A) ≡ EVDirect(λi,λ D,A) − EVPortfolio(A). (10)
Then, investor i will choose FDI when Diff (λi,λ D,A) > 0;w i l lc h o o s eF P Iw h e nDiff (λi,λ D,A) <
0; and will be indiﬀerent between the two (i.e., may choose either FDI or FPI) when Diff (λi,λ D,A)=
0.
Proposition 2 studies the eﬀect of diﬀerent parameters on the function Diff (λi,λ D,A),a n d
thus on the choice between the two forms of investment.
13Proposition 2 Investor i is more likely to choose FDI when:
(i) The ﬁxed cost c of FDI is lower.
(ii) The cost of production A in the host country is lower.
(iii) The probability of getting a liquidity shock λi is lower.
(iv) The market-perceived probability λD of a liquidity shock for FDI investors is higher.
The result in Part (i) is expected: investors are less likely to choose FDI when the ﬁxed cost
they have to incur in order to set the direct investment up is higher. Part (ii) of the proposition
says that when the cost of production A in the host country is higher, investors are less likely to
choose FDI. The intuition behind this result is that when the cost of production increases, the
overall proﬁtability of investment projects decreases, and this makes it less beneﬁcial to incur the
additional ﬁxed cost associated with FDI. Part (iii) of the proposition means that investors with
lower ex ante liquidity needs are more likely to choose direct investments. This is because these
investors expect to beneﬁt more from the long-term eﬃciency associated with FDI, and to suﬀer
less from the lower short-term price of this form of investment. Finally, Part (iv) of the proposition
states that when the probability λD that is assessed by the market to a liquidity shock of FDI
investors increases, investors are more likely to choose FDI. The intuition is related to the fact that
the resale price of FDI increases in λD (see Proposition 1). This makes direct investments more
attractive relative to portfolio investments.
4 FDI and FPI in Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium Outcomes
So far, we analyzed the equilibrium choice of investors between the two types of investment given
the market-perceived probability λD. To complete the deﬁnition of equilibrium, we need to specify
how λD is determined. Assuming that rational expectations hold in the market, λD has to be
consistent with the equilibrium choice of investors between FDI and FPI. Thus, it is given by the
following equation:
λD =
λH · λH,FDI + λL · λL,FDI
λH,FDI + λL,FDI
. (11)
Here, λH,FDI is the proportion of λH investors who choose FDI in equilibrium and λL,FDI is
the proportion of λL investors who choose FDI in equilibrium.
14It should be noted that if all investors choose FPI in equilibrium, λD cannot be deﬁned by
the above equation. This is because in such an equilibrium, investors are not expected to choose
FDI at all. Thus, we need to make an oﬀ-equilibrium assumption to determine λD in case that an
investor diverges from that equilibrium and chooses to hold a direct investment. Since λL investors
have greater incentives to hold direct investments than λH investors (see Proposition 2), we assume
that, in an equilibrium where all investors choose FPI, if an investor diverges and invests in FDI,
the market assesses a probability of λL to the event that this investor had a liquidity shock. Note
that this oﬀ-equilibrium assumption is not important for our results.
We now turn to characterize the equilibrium outcomes. A ﬁrst crucial result is that there
cannot be an equilibrium where some λH investors choose FDI, while some λL investors choose
FPI. To see this, note that such an equilibrium would imply that Diff (λH,λ D,A) ≥ 0 while
Diff (λL,λ D,A) ≤ 0. However, this is a contradiction to the result that Diff (λi,λ D,A) is
strictly decreasing in λi, which is shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Thus, only ﬁve cases can
potentially be observed in equilibrium. These are summarized as follows:
Case 1: All investors choose FDI.
Case 2: λL investors choose FDI; λH investors split between FDI and FPI.
Case 3: λL investors choose FDI; λH investors choose FPI.
Case 4: λL investors split between FDI and FPI; λH investors choose FPI.
Case 5: All investors choose FPI.
In describing the equilibrium outcomes below, we will often refer to these cases. It is worth
noting that as we move from Case 1 to Case 5, the amount of FDI in the economy decreases, while
the amount of FPI increases. Note also that only in cases 2, 3, and 4, FDI and FPI coexist in
the economy. Also, among these, Case 3 exhibits the largest diﬀerence between expected liquidity
needs for a representative FDI investor and those for a representative FPI investor.
Proposition 3 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium outcomes as a function of two
parameters: λH and A.T h ev a l u eo fλH reﬂects the probability that investors with high expected
liquidity needs will get a liquidity shock. Since we assumed that λL + λH =1 , we know that the
value of λH also indirectly determines the value of λL (which reﬂects the probability that investors
with low expected liquidity needs will get a liquidity shock). Thus, our interpretation is that an
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcomes
the cost of production. An increase in A thus reduces the proﬁtability of the investment project. A
key in the characterization of equilibrium outcomes will be the threshold value A∗, which is deﬁned











Proposition 3 (i) For any A<A ∗,t h e r ee x i s tλ∗
H(A) and λ∗∗






H(A) are strictly decreasing in A.T h e n ,w h e n1
2 <λ H <λ ∗
H(A), the only
possible equilibrium is Case 1; when λ∗
H(A) <λ H <λ ∗∗
H(A), the possible equilibria are Case 1, Case
2, and Case 3; and when λ∗∗
H(A) <λ H < 1, the only possible equilibrium is Case 3.
(ii) For any A>A ∗,t h e r ee x i s t sλ∗∗∗
H (A),w h e r e1
2 <λ ∗∗∗
H (A) ≤ 1 and λ∗∗∗
H (A) is strictly
increasing in A.T h e n ,w h e n1
2 <λ H <λ ∗∗∗
H (A), the only possible equilibrium is Case 5; and when
λ∗∗∗
H (A) <λ H < 1, the only possible equilibrium is Case 3.14
Figure 1 provides a simple illustration of the equilibrium characterization.
14For brevity, we do not characterize here the equilibrium outcomes for the speciﬁc values: A = A





H ;a n dλH = λ
∗∗∗
H .
16We would like to discuss four features of the equilibrium outcomes. These are organized in four
corollaries below.
Corollary 1: If FDI and FPI coexist in equilibrium, then the expected liquidity needs of FDI
investors are lower, on average, than the expected liquidity needs of FPI investors.
As noted above, the only possible cases in equilibrium, where FDI and FPI coexist, are cases
2, 3, and 4. In all these cases, liquidity shocks are more common among FPI investors than among
FDI investors. The intuition is simple: investors with high expected liquidity needs care less about
the long-term eﬃciency of FDI, and care more about the short-term price. Thus, they have a higher
tendency to invest in FPI. On the other hand, investors with low expected liquidity needs tend to
prefer FDI. This result is consistent with the casual observation that FDI investors are often large
and stable multinational companies with low expected liquidity needs, whereas FPI investors (such
as global mutual funds) are, on average, more vulnerable to liquidity shocks. This result contributes
to the high withdrawal ratio of FPI relative to FDI, which can account for the empirically-observed
higher volatility of net FPI inﬂows.
Corollary 2: As the cost of production in the host country increases, there will be more FPI
and less FDI in equilibrium.
We can see this clearly by looking at Figure 1. As the level of A, which represents the cost of
production in the host country, increases, equilibrium outcomes change from Case 1, via cases 2
and 3, to Case 5 — i.e., they gradually exhibit more FPI and less FDI. Since A represents the cost
of production, we expect developed countries to have higher levels of A. Thus, our model predicts
that developed countries will attract more FPI, whereas developing countries will attract more
FDI. This is indeed consistent with empirical evidence. The intuition is the following: developed
countries have higher costs of production, and thus lower proﬁtability of investment projects. Thus,
in these countries, it is less beneﬁcial to pay the ﬁxed costs associated with establishing an FDI
investment.
Corollary 3: As the heterogeneity among investors increases, a separating equilibrium — with a
large diﬀerence between the withdrawal rate of FPI and the withdrawal rate of FDI — becomes more
likely.
This result can also be seen in Figure 1. When A<A ∗,a ni n c r e a s ei nλH shifts the equilibrium
outcome from Case 1, which is a pooling equilibrium, to Case 3, which is a separating equilibrium
17with a large diﬀerence between the withdrawal rates of the two types of investment. When A>A ∗,
an increase in λH shifts the equilibrium outcome from Case 5, which is a pooling equilibrium, to
Case 3. The implication is that a high level of heterogeneity among investors causes them to be
attracted to diﬀerent types of investment, and leads to observed diﬀerences in withdrawal rates and
volatility between FDI and FPI.
Corollary 4: There is a region of the fundamentals with multiple equilibria.
As noted in the proposition, multiple equilibria exist when A<A ∗ and λ∗
H(A) <λ H <λ ∗∗
H(A).
In this region, Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 are possible equilibria. The reason for the multiplicity
is the existence of externalities among λH investors. A λH investor beneﬁts from having other
investors of her type investing in the same type of investment. This is because, then, when she tries
to sell the project, the price will not be that low since the market knows that the sale is very likely
to be driven by a liquidity shock. As a result, when all λH investors invest in portfolio investments,
an individual λH investor would like to do the same thing in order to avoid the low price of a
direct investment in case she needs to sell (given that she needs to sell quite often). Similarly, when
all λH investors invest in direct investments, an individual λH investor would like to invest in a
direct investment as well. This multiplicity may generate jumps from an equilibrium with a lot
of direct investments to an equilibrium with much less direct investments. This may explain why
some countries have more direct investments than other countries with similar characteristics, and
why some periods of time are characterized by more direct investments than others. The existence
of multiple equilibria also generates interesting welfare implications that will be discussed below.
4.2 The Probability of Early Withdrawals
Our analysis thus far showed that whenever the two types of investment coexist in equilibrium,
portfolio investors will be more likely than direct investors to get a liquidity shock that forces them
to sell their investment in the short term. This, however, does not necessarily imply that FPI’s
are being reversed more often than FDI’s in equilibrium. This is because, in our model, FDI’s are
being liquidated, not only because of a liquidity shock, but sometimes due to a low realization of ε.
To see this formally, consider Case 3 as an equilibrium. This is the equilibrium where all λH
investors choose FPI and all λL investors choose FDI. Thus, it exhibits the largest diﬀerence between
the expected liquidity needs of FPI investors and those of FDI investors. In this equilibrium, the
18probability of an early withdrawal of FPI is λH, whereas the probability of an early withdrawal of
FDI is λL +( 1− λL)G(εD(λL)). Analyzing the diﬀerence between these two expressions, we can
see that there are two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, since λH >λ L, the probability of an
early withdrawal that is driven by a liquidity shock is greater for FPI than for FDI. But, on the
other hand, there is a probability of (1 − λL)G(εD(λL)) that an FDI will be sold at period 1 due
to a low realization of ε. This possibility does not exist with an FPI. The condition, under which
portfolio investments are being liquidated more often at period 1 than direct investments is then:
λH >λ L +( 1− λL)G(εD(λL)). (13)
Since the left hand side of this condition increases in λH and the right hand side decreases in λH
(recall that λH =1−λL), this condition implies that portfolio investments will be liquidated more
often in the short term as long as λH is high enough, or, in other words, as long as the heterogeneity
among investors is suﬃciently strong.
4.3 Welfare Analysis
Our model has interesting welfare implications for the region of parameters with multiple equilibria
—i . e . ,w h e nA<A ∗ and λ∗
H(A) <λ H <λ ∗∗
H(A). As a starting point, we analyze foreign investors’
welfare in this region of parameters, given the current framework. Then, we use the result to study
the implications for the welfare of residents of the host country, which is the main focus of our
welfare analysis.
When A<A ∗ and λ∗
H(A) <λ H <λ ∗∗
H(A), our model has three equilibria: Case 1, Case 2, and
Case 3. Our analysis shows that when these three equilibria are possible, Case 1 represents a Pareto
improvement over the other two equilibria. To see this, note that under Case 3, λH investors choose
FPI and gain an expected payoﬀ of 1
2A. Similarly, under Case 2, they are indiﬀerent between FDI
and FPI, and thus also gain an expected payoﬀ of 1
2A. Under Case 1, however, they choose FDI





. We know that this payoﬀ is greater than 1
2A,
since λH investors chose to get it rather than to invest in FPI and get 1
2A.T h u s ,λH investors are
better oﬀ under Case 1, where they beneﬁt from the higher eﬃciency of FDI. When other equilibria
occur in this range of parameters, it is because of a coordination failure: λH investors choose not to
invest in FDI because they believe other λH investors will not invest in FDI, and thus will reduce
the expected value of this type of investment.
19As for λL investors, in all three equilibria they choose FDI. Under Case 3, their expected payoﬀ
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.S i n c eEVDirect(λi,λ D,A) is increasing in λD,
we know that λL investors are better oﬀ in Case 1. The reason is that under Case 1, all λH investors
choose direct investments, and thus the price of direct investments in period 1 is higher.
With these results in mind, let us address the diﬀerences in welfare from the point of view of
the residents of the host country. Up to this point, the residents of the host country did not have
an explicit role in our model. A natural way to introduce them is to assume that they own the local
projects initially, and sell them to foreign investors. Let us assume that there is a continuum [0,1] of
local residents; each one holds an investment project in period 0. At this time, they sell the projects
to the foreign investors. After the sales have taken place, the events in the model are exactly the
same as we described before: in period 0, foreign investors choose the form of investment, and in
period 1 they make a decision on whether to sell their investments or not. Given this structure,
the welfare analysis from the point of view of the local residents boils down to analyzing the price
that they get for their projects in period 0.
In period 0, there are two types of foreign investors buying the investment projects from the
residents of the host country: λH investors and λL investors. Since the type of each investor is not
observable, in a competitive equilibrium, the price of projects in period 0 will be determined by
the lowest between the value that is incurred to λH investors and the value that is incurred to λL
investors from holding the project. In our model, this is always the value that is incurred to λH
investors. Thus, λL investors capture some of the rent due to their ability to maintain the project
for a long time, and λH investors do not capture any rent.
The price that local residents get for the projects in period 0 will then be 1
2A when either





when Case 1 is the realized
equilibrium. As we showed above, in the region where all three equilibria are possible, the ﬁrst
expression is lower than the second one, meaning that domestic residents get higher prices when
Case 1 is the realized equilibrium. This suggests that the host country may beneﬁt from encouraging
more investments to be in the form of FDI.
This recommendation, however, should be taken with caution. Our model suggests that inter-
vention to encourage FDI will be beneﬁcial to the host country only in the region of parameters
20where there are multiple equilibria. In this region, portfolio investments are chosen due to a co-
ordination failure, which can be prevented by intervention. In all other regions of parameters,
where our model has only one equilibrium, the price that domestic residents get in equilibrium is
higher than what they could have gotten under other alternative cases. Thus, in these regions,
intervention to encourage more FDI will not be beneﬁcial to the host country. For example, when
A>A ∗ and 1
2 <λ H <λ ∗∗∗
H (A), the only equilibrium in our model is Case 5. In this region of
parameters, however, this happens because FDI is not eﬃcient due to high production costs, and
thus encouraging FDI will only reduce the price obtained by domestic residents, and will not be
beneﬁcial.
5T h e E ﬀect of Transparency
The trade oﬀ between direct investments and portfolio investments in our model is based on asym-
metric information. Reducing the degree of asymmetric information via greater transparency can
alter the trade oﬀ between the two types of investment. In this section we modify our framework
to allow for diﬀerent degrees of transparency. We focus on corporate-governance transparency: the
transparency between managers and owners. When this measure of transparency is higher, owners,
who do not act as managers, are more informed about the fundamentals of their projects. We will
study the eﬀect of transparency on the patterns of investment in equilibrium.
Aside from the theoretical interest in the eﬀect of transparency on the trade oﬀ between the two
types of investment, the analysis in this section is important because it sheds light on the diﬀerences
in patterns of investment between developing and developed economies. The conclusions provided
in this section are based on the hypothesis that corporate-governance transparency is higher in
developed economies than in developing economies.
Assume that in case of a portfolio investment, the owner of the project observes ε in period
1 with probability α (0 <α<1). If this happens, the owner of the project can act as a direct
investor: she can instruct the manager to choose the optimal level of k, and she can decide to sell
the project if the realization of ε is below a certain threshold. Our interpretation is that a higher
α represents a better ﬂow of information between the manager and the owner when the two are
not the same person. As a result, a higher α represents a higher level of ex ante transparency. For
21simplicity, in this section, we assume that c =0 .
The introduction of the parameter α into the model does not change the analysis of direct invest-
ments. It only changes the analysis of portfolio investments. When owners of portfolio investments
observe ε, they will be able to achieve the same management eﬃciency as direct investors. Thus,
if they don’t sell the project in period 1, their investment will yield an expected payoﬀ of:
E(1+ε)2
2A
(see (3)). Additionally, they also may decide to sell the project if the realization of ε is below a
certain level. We denote this threshold level of ε as εP. Using the same principles as in (5) and
(6), we derive the following equation that determines εP as a function of α and λp (the latter is
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2 g(ε)dε + λp




· (1 + εP (α,λp))
2 . (14)
This equation is slightly diﬀerent from the one implied by (5) and (6), as it considers the fact
that a portfolio investor observes ε with probability α. As we show in the appendix, for every λp
and α between 0 and 1, there is a unique solution for εP between −1 and 0. As we also show in the
appendix, the analysis of the equation reveals that εP (α,λP) is increasing in λp and decreasing in
α. Thus, when the probability of a liquidity shock increases, there is, on average, a smaller problem
of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, and investors will sell their projects under a
larger range of parameters. Similarly, when the probability of information being revealed to owners
increases, there is, on average, a greater problem of asymmetric information, and investors will
sell their projects under a smaller range of parameters. A direct result of the last property is that
εP (α,x) >ε D (x) for every 0 <α<1 — i.e., when the probability of liquidity shocks is the same
across the two investments, FPI will be sold at a higher price than FDI.
Following (6), we know that the price of portfolio investments in period 1 will be:
(1+εP(α,λp))2
2A .
Then, the ex ante expected payoﬀ from a portfolio investment for a λi investor will be:






















When 0 <α<1, the basic trade oﬀ between direct investments and portfolio investments
22remains the same as in previous sections. On average, direct investments still provide more infor-
mation to owners. This enables owners to achieve more management eﬃciency, but also reduces
the price they can get when they sell their investments in period 1. As α increases, the diﬀerences
between the expected payoﬀs from the two types of investment become smaller.
T h ea n a l y s i so fe q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m e sh e r ei ss i m ilar to the one in previous sections: investors
choose between the two types of investment based on expected values, while λD is determined by
(11). In addition, here λP also has to be determined by a similar condition, reﬂecting the idea
that the market expectations regarding the probability that FPI investors will get a liquidity shock
are consistent with investors’ equilibrium strategies. We also need to add another oﬀ-equilibrium
assumption for the case that all investors choose FDI in equilibrium and an investor diverges from
that equilibrium and chooses to hold FPI. Following the logic in Section 4, we assume that in this
case the market assesses a probability λH that the portfolio investor receives a liquidity shock. This
is because λH investors have greater incentives to hold portfolio investments than λL investors.
In this section, we are mainly interested in the eﬀect of the degree of transparency α on the
possible equilibrium outcomes. Proposition 4 characterizes the eﬀect of α on the equilibrium out-
comes. It says that increasing α can aﬀect the possible equilibrium outcomes along three diﬀerent
patterns. These patterns are also illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 4 As α increases, possible equilibrium outcomes can change in one of the following
patterns:
• Case1 → Case 1, 2, 3 → Case 3 → Case 4 → Case 5
• Case1 → Case 1, 2, 3 → Case 1, 2, 4 → Case 4 → Case 5
• Case1 → Case 1, 2, 3 → Case 1, 2, 4 → Case 1, 5 → Case 5
Based on Proposition 4 and on Figure 2, we would like to emphasize two eﬀects of the level of
transparency on the equilibrium outcomes. These are summarized in the following two corollaries.
Corollary 5: As the level of transparency increases, there will be more FPI and less FDI in
equilibrium.
23α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 1, 2, 4
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 1, 5 Case 5 Case 1, 2, 4
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 1, 2, 4
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 1, 2, 4
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 1, 5 Case 5 Case 1, 2, 4
α
Case 1 Case 1, 2, 3 Case 1, 5 Case 5 Case 1, 2, 4
Figure 2: Patterns of Changes in Possible Equilibrium Outcomes as A Function of α
This result can be seen very clearly in Figure 2. As α increases, equilibrium outcomes change
gradually from Case 1 to Case 5 — i.e., they exhibit less FDI and more FPI. The intuition behind
this result is the following: an increase in transparency between owners and managers improves
the eﬃciency of portfolio investments, and thus attracts more investors to this type of investment.
This result is consistent with empirical evidence. Indeed, developed economies that have higher
corporate-governance transparency tend to have more foreign investments in the form of portfolio
investments rather than in the form of direct investments.
Another manifestation of this eﬀect may be that ownership concentration, which clearly gener-
ates more control, will be higher in countries, where the laws/institutions provide a lower level of
shareholders’ rights (which corresponds to a low α). This is consistent with empirical evidence in
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
Corollary 6: As the level of transparency increases, Case 3, which exhibits full separation
between λH and λL investors, is replaced with Case 4, which exhibits only partial separation.
This observation is consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned in the introduction, ac-
cording to which developing economies tend to exhibit larger diﬀerences in volatility between FDI
and FPI. Indeed, in our model, Case 3, which exhibits the biggest diﬀerences in the rate of early
withdrawals between FDI and FPI, is not observed when the level of transparency is very high.
24Rather, it is replaced by Case 4, which exhibits smaller diﬀerences in early withdrawals between the
two types of investment. The intuition for this result is that as α becomes high, the diﬀerence in
eﬃciency between direct investments and portfolio investments becomes small. At the same time,
if λH investors invest in portfolio investments, period-1 prices of these investments will be high,
attracting some λL investors to switch from FDI to FPI.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The model we developed in this paper describes an information-based trade oﬀ between direct
investments and portfolio investments. In the model, direct investors are more informed about
the fundamentals of their projects. This information enables them to manage their projects more
eﬃciently. However, it also creates an asymmetric-information problem in case they need to sell
their projects prematurely, and reduces the price they can get in that case. As a result, investors,
who know they are more likely to get a liquidity shock that forces them to sell early, are more likely
to choose portfolio investments, whereas investors, who know they are less likely to get a liquidity
shock, are more likely to choose direct investments.
The model generates several results that are consistent with empirical evidence. First, devel-
oped economies attract larger shares of FPI than developing economies. This is because the high
production costs in developed economies make the projects there less proﬁtable, and thus make
it less beneﬁcial to incur the ﬁxed costs associated with FDI. Moreover, the high transparency in
developed economies makes FPI there more eﬃcient. Second, since investors with high expected
liquidity needs are attracted to FPI, while those with low expected liquidity needs are attracted to
FDI, our model can account for the high observed withdrawal rates of FPI relative to FDI, which
also contribute to a high volatility of the former relative to the latter. Third, developed economies
with high levels of transparency are expected to have smaller diﬀerences between the withdrawal
ratios of FPI and those of FDI. This is because the high eﬃciency of FPI in those economies at-
tracts more investors with low expected liquidity needs to FPI, and prevents complete separation
in equilibrium between investors with low expected liquidity needs and those with high expected
liquidity needs.
In the rest of this section, we highlight six additional implications of our model that seem to us
25as promising directions for future research.
One, the information-based trade oﬀ between direct investments and portfolio investments has
implications for the expected yields on each type of investment. Thus, in case of a liquidity shock,
direct investors get a very low return on their investment. Investors will be willing to bear that risk
and make direct investments only if they are compensated in the form of a higher expected yield.
In order to address this issue in an appropriate way, our model should be adjusted to include risk
averse agents. As for empirical evidence, we are not aware of any empirical study that looked at
the diﬀerences between the expected yield on direct investments and the expected yield on portfolio
investments. We think our framework suggests an interesting testable prediction on this point.
Two, our model can be extended to include debt ﬂows. As is known in the theory of corporate
ﬁnance, the price of debt is, in most cases, less sensitive to problems of asymmetric information.
Thus, in our framework, the return on debt is expected to be less sensitive to liquidity shocks, and
thus debt is expected to attract investors with even higher expected liquidity needs.
Three, in Section 5, we developed the implications of transparency for cross-sectional diﬀerences
in the composition and volatility of foreign equity ﬂows. An interesting extension is to analyze the
implications of transparency for time-series diﬀerences. Thus, in times of crisis, transparency may
be lower, and thus the share of FDI will be larger and the diﬀerences in withdrawal rates between
FPI and FDI will be larger as well. This seems consistent with casual empirical observations.
Four, as demonstrated in Section 4.3, portfolio investments, in our model, occur sometimes
as a result of a coordination failure among investors with high expected liquidity needs. When
this happens, the host country can be better-oﬀ if investors invest in direct investments. In these
scenarios, the government can eliminate the bad equilibrium and improve welfare by encouraging
FDI. However, as we also noted in the section, this recommendation should be taken with caution,
since in other scenarios encouraging FDI might reduce welfare due to the high set-up costs of this
form of investment. We believe that a more thorough analysis should be performed to understand
when, in the real world, government intervention is warranted and when it is not. Also, other
policy measures may be considered as means to improve welfare. For example, improving the
corporate governance and judicial system in the country may enable managers and owners of
portfolio investments to write contracts that would entice managers to choose capital as a function
of productivity. This would improve not only the eﬃciency of FPI, but welfare overall.
26Five, our model generates predictions on the reversals of FDI and FPI in equilibrium. In the
paper, we used these predictions to shed some light on the diﬀerences in volatility between net
FDI inﬂows and net FPI inﬂows in the real world. We are aware that a full understanding of the
diﬀerences in volatility requires one to analyze not only the reversals of the two forms of investment,
but also the changes in new inﬂows over time. While this is beyond the scope of the current paper,
we think that an extension of our model into a dynamic framework will be useful in conducting
this analysis.
Six, our model may be applicable to episodes like the Mexican crisis or the East Asian crisis,
where FPI’s were reversed much more than FDI’s. One problem in this application is that liquidity
shocks in our model are idiosyncratic, whereas the liquidity shocks in those episodes were understood
to be aggregate shocks aﬀecting the overall market liquidity. Thus, introducing aggregate shocks
into the model may be an interesting extension of the current analysis. We believe that such an
extension will not change the main results in the paper, especially those on the reversibility of
FDI and FPI. The only assumption that is needed for our analysis to go through in the extended
framework is that diﬀerent investors will be aﬀected to diﬀerent degrees by aggregate liquidity
shocks. Then, investors who are very sensitive to aggregate liquidity shocks will choose FPI,
whereas those who are less sensitive to aggregate liquidity shocks will choose FDI. This, we believe,
will keep the main results of the paper intact.
7A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
















which can be written as follows:
















Analyzing this equation, we can see that as λD approaches 0, εD(λD) approaches −1;a n da s
λD approaches 1, εD(λD) approaches 0. Also, for any λD between 0 and 1, εD(λD) must be below
0. Now, analyzing the derivatives of F (λD,ε D), we get:
27∂F (λD,ε D)
∂λD













= −2(1+εD)[(1− λD)G(εD)+λD] < 0.
Thus, by the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂εD(λD)
∂λD > 0. As a result, for every 0 ≤ λD ≤ 1,t h e r e
is a unique solution to εD between −1 and 0,w h e r eεD(λD) is monotonically increasing in λD.
(ii) This part follows directly from equation (6) that deﬁnes P1,D as a function of εD. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
From (8), (9), and (10), we know that



































εD(λD) (1 + ε)
2 g (ε)dε
⎤
⎦ + λi · (1 + εD(λD))
2 − 2Ac − 1.
Then, the decision of investors between FDI and FPI depends on the sign of D(λi,λ D,A).A n
increase (decrease) in D(λi,λ D,A) makes it more likely that the investor will choose FDI (FPI). We
now show that the signs of the derivatives of D(λi,λ D,A) with respect to the diﬀerent parameters





































(1 + εD(λD))[(1 − λi)G(εD(λD)) + λi] > 0,
where we used the result in Proposition 1 to tell that
∂εD(λD)
∂λD > 0. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
We start by deﬁning the conditions for each case to be an equilibrium. We base these conditions
on: The equilibrium choice of agents between FDI and FPI, as deﬁned in Section 3; the equilibrium
value of λD,a sd e ﬁned in Section 4 (including the oﬀ-equilibrium assumption); and the properties
of the function D(λi,λ D,A), as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Then, the conditions are as





≥ 0. Case 2 is an equilibrium iff D(λH,λ L,A)





≥ 0. Case 3 is an equilibrium iff D(λH,λ L,A) ≤ 0 and D(λL,λ L,A) ≥ 0.
Case 4 is an equilibrium iff D(λL,λ L,A)=0 . Case 5 is an equilibrium iff D(λL,λ L,A) ≤ 0.
Now, we deﬁne the thresholds λ∗
H(A), λ∗∗
H(A),a n dλ∗∗∗
H (A) that are included in the proposition.
Threshold λ∗












=0 . Finally, threshold λ∗∗∗




L (A) ≡ 1 − λ∗∗∗
H (A)).
Now, we characterize these thresholds as functions of A. The illustration provided in Figure 1





(Recall that A∗ is deﬁned in (12).) Then, by the properties of D(λi,λ D,A),w h i c hw e r es h o w n
in the proof of Proposition 2, we know that both λ∗
H(A) and λ∗∗
H(A) are decreasing in A,a n d
that λ∗∗
H(A) >λ ∗
H(A). Also, by examining the function D(λi,λ D,A), we can tell that λ∗∗
H(0) < 1.
Finally, since D(λ,λ,A) is decreasing in λ (this is shown at the end of this proof) and in A (as
was shown in the proof of Proposition 2), λ∗∗∗
H (A) is increasing in A.
Using the equilibrium conditions, we can now specify when each equilibrium will occur relative to
the thresholds deﬁned above. This speciﬁcation relies on the properties of the function D(λi,λ D,A),
which were shown in the proof of Proposition 2, and on the property that D(λ,λ,A) is decreasing in
λ, which will be shown below. Case 1 is an equilibrium iff λH ≤ λ∗∗
H(A). Case 2 is an equilibrium
iff λ∗
H(A) ≤ λH ≤ λ∗∗
H(A). Case 3 is an equilibrium iff λH ≥ λ∗
H(A) and λH ≥ λ∗∗∗
H (A).C a s e4
is an equilibrium iff λH = λ∗∗∗
H (A). Case 5 is an equilibrium iff λH ≤ λ∗∗∗
H (A). This leads to the
characterization of equilibrium outcomes stated in the proposition.









εD(λ) (1 + ε)
2 g(ε)dε
⎤
⎦ + λ · (1 + εD(λ))
















(1 + εD(λ))[(1 − λ)G(εD(λ)) + λ].
Plugging in the expression for
∂εD(λ)






























2 g(ε)dε < 0
QED.
Characterization of εP (α,λP)
Equation (14) can be written as:













































= −2(1+εP)[(1− λP)αG(εP)+λP] < 0.
Then, using the Implicit Function Theorem, we get that
∂εP(α,λP)
∂α < 0,a n d
∂εP(α,λP)
∂λP > 0.
Moreover, when λP approaches 1, εP approaches 0;w h e nλP approaches 0, εP approaches −1;
30when α approaches 1, εP approaches εD(≤ 0); and when α approaches 0, εP approaches 0.T h u s ,
for every λP and α between 0 and 1, there is a unique solution for εP between −1 and 0. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We deﬁne the function Diffα (λi,λ D,λ P) to capture the diﬀerence between the expected value
of FDI and the expected value of FPI. It is given as follows:

















−1 (1 + εD(λD))
2 g (ε)dε +
R 1
εD(λD) (1 + ε)
2 g (ε)dε
−(1 − α) − α
R εP(α,λp)










⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
We start by studying the derivatives of Diffα (λi,λ D,λ P) with respect to the parameters λD,
λP, λi,a n dα:







(1 + εD(λD))[(1 − λi)G(εD(λD)) + λi] > 0.







(1 + εP(α,λP))[α(1 − λi)G(εP(α,λP)) + λi] < 0.

































This expression is negative. To see why, note that the only way to make it non-negative is to have
εP (α,λp) <ε D(λD).T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t λp <λ D, and also that Diffα (λi,λ D,λ P) is positive for
both λH and λL investors. However, these two implications contradict each other, as the second
one implies that all investors choose FDI in equilibrium, which means that λp cannot be smaller
than λD.
























(1 + εP (α,λP))[(1 − λi)αG(εP (α,λP)) + λi].


















(1 − λi)αG(εP (α,λP)) + λi





(1 + εP (α,λP))




We can see that this is negative whenever λP ≥ λi.
Now, we turn to characterize the equilibrium outcomes. Since
∂Diffα(λi,λD,λP)
∂λi < 0,t h eo n l y
possible cases in equilibrium are cases 1-5. Then, following the logic in the proof of Proposition












≥ 0. Case 3 is an equilibrium iff Diffα (λH,λ L,λ H) ≤ 0 and Diffα (λL,λ L,λ H)












We can see that the analysis of equilibrium outcomes boils down to determining whether each












Since all four threshold values satisfy λP ≥ λi, they are all decreasing in α.A s a r e s u l t , a s
α increases, we gradually move from a situation where all thresholds are positive, via situations
where some are positive and some are negative, to a situation where they are all negative. The
exact order of the four threshold values will determine the exact pattern, and this will dictate the
eﬀect of α on possible equilibrium outcomes.




∂λD > 0,a n d
∂Diffα(λi,λD,λP)
∂λP < 0, we know that the threshold






. Thus, there are only three possible orders for the four threshold signals: The ﬁrst

































Analyzing the conditions for the diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes, we can see that these three or-
ders dictate the three patterns, mentioned in the proposition, along which α aﬀects the possible
32equilibrium outcomes. QED.
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